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Abstract
This article undertakes a comparative analysis of special education policy through the juxtaposition
of two recent Supreme Court actions: Allston v. Lower Merion School District (2015) and Endrew F. v.
Douglas County School District (2017). This comparison reveals an ordering of special education
policy around questions of race. Specifically, this article argues that special education policy is governed by a racecraft of disability labeling that defines students of color as variously disabled and
through a biopolitics of special education that expands disability services for individual students who
are within the truth demarcated by scientific-juridical mediations of life. Against such negative inflections of life, this article concludes by turning to John Dewey’s educational and democratic thinking to
posit an affirmation of educational life that counters the morbid symptoms that presently define education’s interregnum.
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n April 6, 2015, the Supreme Court denied
Allston v. Lower Merion School District a writ of
certiorari. Allston had sought legal redress for
what the Petitioners argued was persistent, significant, and
systematic racial discrimination. Central to this argument was the
legal claim that Lower Merion School District (LMSD) had
wrongly identified African American students as learning disabled
and had as such disproportionality placed and kept Black students
in special education environments, depriving the Petitioners of
appropriate educations. Given the extent of racial discrimination,
the Petitioners sought legal redress under Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act originally before the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and then before the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. On October 20, 2011, District Judge Harvey
Bartle III granted summary judgment for LMSD, holding that the
Petitioners had failed to produce sufficient evidence of racial
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discrimination. This holding was affirmed in a 2–1 decision by the
Third Circuit on September 12, 2014, and on October 29, 2014,
the Court of Appeals denied the Petitioners’ request for an en banc
hearing.
The denial of certiorari for Allston helps to narrate the ways
special education policy is implicated in a troubled history of racial
discrimination in American education. As many scholars (Artiles,
2011; Connor & Ferri, 2005; Ferri & Connor, 2005a, 2005b, 2006;
Harry & Klinger, 2006; Losen & Orfield, 2002) have noted, the
disproportionate placements of Black students in special education
classes subverts Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and facilitates
the resegregation of American education. While denial of certiorari

Benjamin Kearl is an Assistant Professor at Purdue University
Fort Wayne.
Feature article

1

is not a legal decision and as such does not indicate a holding for
either the Petitioner or the Respondent, reviewing the latter’s Brief
in Opposition shows the line of reasoning presented to the
Supreme Court concerning the uses of disability labeling within,
by, and for special education policy. In responding to the Petition,
LMSD presented four arguments. First, the Third Circuit’s holding
involved application of well-settled law, and claims that it conflicted with other courts of appeals were fabricated. Second, the
Petition did not raise a viable legal argument, but instead simply
asked the Supreme Court to view the facts of the case differently
and was thus nothing more than a request for error correction.
Third, statistical and circumstantial evidence of the overrepresentation and disproportionate placements of minority students is
not, in and of itself, probative. On this point, LMSD, citing the
Third Circuit’s majority opinion, argued that “each individual
student’s educational needs had been assessed and satisfied
through a thorough individualized IEP [individual education
program] process” (“Respondents Brief in Opposition,” Allston v.
Lower Merion School District, 2015, 3). Finally, LMSD argued that
the Court’s intervention was unwarranted given the Petitioners’
ever-shifting positions “regarding the basic question of whether
they are or are not disabled within the meaning of the [Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act] IDEA” (“Respondents Brief in
Opposition,” Allston v. Lower Merion School District, 2015, 5).
The importance Allston has on special education policy is
brought into relief through its juxtaposition with the recent
Supreme Court decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School
District (2017). On March 22, 2017, the Court unanimously held
that Douglas County School District (DCSD) had failed to meet its
substantive obligation under the IDEA to offer Endrew F. an IEP
reasonably calculated to allow him to make adequate yearly
progress appropriate to his circumstance as a child with autism.
This holding vacated a previous decision by the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, which had held that to meet the intent of the
IDEA, school districts simply needed to provide minimal special
education services. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John
Roberts argued that the Tenth Circuit had wrongly interpreted the
IDEA in maintaining that DCSD had met its substantive obligation
to Endrew F. because it had done “merely more than de minimis.”
Against this limited legal interpretation, the Court established the
more expansive standard that special education must be “appropriately ambitious” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District,
2017, 8). and should allow all children “the chance to meet challenging objectives” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District,
2017, 14). While Endrew raised a number of important questions
about what legally constitutes free and appropriate educations, its
juxtaposition with Allston raises a more immediate question:
“What’s so special about special education for poor and minority
children” (Colker, 2013, p. 2)?
In juxtaposing Allston and Endrew, this essay is interested in
how special education policy juridically constructs individuals
through scientific classifications that inhere disabilities as discrete
rights. What results is a special educational interregnum within
which “disability ‘harms’ and ‘injuries’ are only deemed bona fide
within a framework of scaled-down disability definitions (read:
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fictions) elevated to indisputable truth-claims and rendered visible
in law” (Campbell, 2009, p. 110). Gramsci (1971) defined interregnum as a period of crisis between regimes during which “the crisis
consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new
cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid
symptoms appear” (p. 276). Interregnum is a helpful analytic for
noting the ways educational life is increasingly experienced
through inflections of what Foucault (1990) discussed as biopolitics. Allston and Endrew provide a way of philosophically reflecting
on the movement between educational regimes and on how these
moves inflect student lives differently. Read together, these cases
suggest juridical uses of classificatory science toward individual
determinations of disabilities that preclude redress of the collective
effects of racial discrimination and thus the birth of new conditions of educational life.
As Collins (2015) has demonstrated, legal juxtapositions
evidence how special education policy exploits the interstice of
race and disability toward the dislocation of Black lives. Given that
special education is increasingly mediated legally, attending to
cases that put into conversation how the Supreme Court’s response
to the uses of disability labeling differs when race is a constitutive
factor is important for understanding the interregnum that
presently structures American education. While Endrew has been
celebrated by disability rights advocates, viewed against Allston, it
reveals a morbid “biopedagogy” (Lewis, 2009), the lesson of which
is that educational life is most easily imaged negatively as not
disabled and as non-Black. The juxtaposition undertaken here is
motivated by noticing how affirming educational life is made
difficult by what Campbell and Sitze (2013) described as “biopolitical racism,” that is, a racism that explains why, despite prolonged
institutional attempts at inclusion, “certain populations nevertheless seem permanently incapable of achieving flourishing lives
within those institutions” (p. 19). For Foucault (1990), biopolitics
contingently qualifies which lives are deserving/eligible of fostering and disallows those lives deemed as undeserving/ineligible.
These qualifications make life both a location for historical inquiry
and a site of future political-economic speculations. It is within
these legally mediated qualifications that students of color must
navigate their educational futures. As this introduction suggests,
these efforts can be disorienting as they requiring moving through
legal ascriptions of one’s status within education.
That life has both a historicity and futuricity necessitates
interrogating how special education policy uses inclusion to foster
or disallow life. This interrogation is undertaken in two parts: First,
by critiquing the normalizing dispositifs of ableism and Whiteness
from the overlapping theoretical vantages of racecraft, DisCrit, and
Critical Whiteness Studies; and second, through elaborating the
policy implications of understanding intersections of race and
disability as resulting from each moving between in/voluntary
statuses. To illustrate these strange maneuverings, this second
section undertakes genealogical readings of the learning disability
(LD) label, the legal standard of separate but equal, and the
psychological study of childhood. Each of these historical emergences presupposes that everyone is always already included—
both scientifically and juridically—within both schools and
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society. Fundamental to critiquing ableism and Whiteness, then, is
an affirmative ontological reframing of disability as definitionally
questionable and politically contestable and an epistemic
reorientation of the normate gaze away from the abled and raced
Other and toward the pathological tendencies of the norm.

The Normalizing Educational Dispositifs of Ableism and
Whiteness
While Endrew requires special education policy to do more than
the minimum, it minimally disrupts the dispositifs of ableism and
Whiteness. Taken together, ableism and Whiteness produce a
present within which special education policy orders education
generally first by qualifying what counts as an appropriate education and then through individual assessments of who—which
bodies—are eligible for and deserving of such educations. Moving
from sovereign power to the necessity that modern subjects learn
to properly conduct themselves according to norms—
“architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions” (Foucault, 1980, p. 194)—dispositifs are
strategic responses to urgent needs that are reciprocally institutional and discursive and that are experienced through the dual
processes of functional overdetermination and strategic elaboration. Turning to criminality, Foucault (1980) elaborated the
workings of these processes. First, measurements of criminality
produce conditions of delinquency within which individuals
become subject to the legalistic construction of a delinquent
milieu, which is invested in maintaining that delinquents have
medically diagnosable behaviors. Having been overdetermined
through medical discourses, criminality is transmogrified from
being a negative legal effect (i.e., crime) to having positive political-
economic purposes by its strategic elaboration into a medical
profession (i.e., psychiatry) whose telos is the defense of society.
This purpose produces ableist and racist conditions that assess
every individual in society for the purpose of completing a picture
of their heredity, ancestry, and childhood. While the derived
images are often presented in court as if they were scientifically
accurate, the genealogy of their knowledge is a eugenic defense of
humanity against degeneration (Baker, 2002; Lewis, 2009).
Extended to schooling, preventing crime is presently elaborated through the medical-legal overdetermination of a school-to-
prison pipeline within which students of color, especially those
with disabilities, are disproportionately dislocated (Adams &
Erevelles, 2015). Applied here, the dispositifs of ableism and
Whiteness function within special education policy by ableist
overdeterminations that project ability as species-typical and
through strategic elaborations of Whiteness as property (Harris,
1993). Campbell (2009) noted that ableism is overdetermined
by the construction of ableist ontological norms and through
the epistemic maintenance of an abled/not-abled dualism. The
resulting disableist milieu positions disability negatively, as
something to be ameliorated without interrogating the norms that
govern such efforts or those binary policies which maintain that
persons are either disabled or abled. LMSD’s Response employed
such reasoning not only to discredit the Petitioners’ argument that
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they had been misidentified but to also position these students’
disabilities negatively. The juxtaposition of Allston and Endrew
thus evidences Campbell’s biopolitical observation that the “law’s
investment in biomedicalism invokes a moral landscape wherein
the unruly body is culpable and blameworthy (and thus held
responsible) whereas the ‘real’ disabled body is innocent (thus
deserving of legal protection)” (p. 35).
Within such investments, Allston emerges as part of a larger
forgotten history of using institutional inclusion to disallow people
of color flourishing lives. In contrast to the dualism used in Allston
and the presumption employed by Endrew that particular disabilities are discrete and deserving of protection, DisCrit questions
either/or uses of disability labeling and contests reductive medical
and social models of disability. Reading Critical Race Theory
(CRT) and Disability Studies together, DisCrit “recognizes the
shifting boundary between normal and abnormal, between ability
and disability, and seeks to question ways in which race contributes
to one being positioned on either side of the line” (Annamma,
Connor, & Ferri, 2013, p. 10). Given its interrogation of either/or
thinking and its attention to the uses of the race and dis/ability,
DisCrit critically extends Dewey’s (1938/1997) critique of educational absolutisms. Viewed against, and in terms of, historically
contingent articulations of the normed body as White, male,
cis-gender, and able, DisCrit interrogates attempts to medically
ground disabilities as biological impairments and to socially
rationalize racial discrimination through scientifically neutral
disability labels. In doing so, DisCrit highlights the scientificity of
juridically sanctioned forms of racial discrimination and the
politicality of scientifically assessed measures of race.
What results from these interrogations are disruptions to
dichotomous and temporally linear uses of disability/ability and a
critical appreciation for how special education policy variously
constructs and maintains statuses of dis/ability. No longer an
either/or, dis/ability embodies an educational use value that
situates students of color and their White peers differently despite
the presumed universality of inclusion. As bodies already marked
by racism, students of color are more likely to experience dis/
ability from a positionality that dislocates them as being “at risk”
and or as having cultural deficits in need of “fixing.” Uses of dis/
ability within special education policy ignore how the collective
effects of racial discrimination dislocate students of color as
“non-citizens and (no)bodies by the very social institutions (legal,
educational, and rehabilitational) that are designed to protect,
nurture, and empower them” (Erevelles & Minear, 2013, p. 355).
Ultimately, DisCrit forces special education policy to contend with
how race and dis/ability strangely maneuver between scientific
and juridical adjudications and to acknowledge that “without
racialized notions of ability, racial difference would simply be racial
difference” (Annamma et al., 2013, p. 15).
Understood as a sleight of hand that is easy to miss, special
education policy maneuvers through individualized conflations of
race and dis/ability within which “racism and ableism often work
in ways that are unspoken, yet racism validates and reinforces
ableism, and ableism validates and reinforces racism” (Annamma
et al., 2013, p. 6). Important to these maneuverings is that race and
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dis/ability are taken for granted as objectively real. Fields and
Fields (2014) defined these strange maneuverings within which
“racism, something an aggressor does” is transformed into “race,
something the target is” as racecraft (p. 17; original emphasis).
Disability labeling furthers the taken-for-grantedness of race
because it lends scientific explanations to social practices predicated solely upon heredity, ancestry, and childhood. Noting the
importance of recognizing the collective intersections of race and
dis/ability, Ogbu (2004) drew critical attention to how a racecraft
of disability labeling disallows students of color appropriate
educations by dislocating minority identities as populational status
problems:
Status problems are external forces that mark a group of people as a
distinct segment from the rest of the population. A group so created is
usually bounded and named . . . Status problems are collective
problems which members of the subordinate group find difficult if not
impossible to solve within existing systems of majority-minority
relations. (p. 4)

Racecraft exposes the sumptuary codes behind the external
forces that mark race for the purposes of creating populational
groups. Moving through present-historical folk classifications of
race, including contemporary uses of DNA, Fields and Fields
(2014) demonstrated how racecraft “highlights the ability of pre-
or non-scientific modes of thought to hijack the minds of the
scientifically literate” (pp. 5–6). A racecraft of disability labeling
thus functions as both science and superstition. For example, while
crime is the political-economic effect of a delinquent milieu,
because criminals are believed to exist, their existence can be
readily proven by testing prisoners for criminal genes. The capacity
of racism to prove the existence of race while also disappearing
behind ableist classifications helps explain why racecraft purposefully invokes witchcraft, which also worked by maneuvering
between scientific and superstitious descriptions to transform an
epistemic label (witchcraft) into an ontological status (witches).
Within the circularity of this circumstantial logic, “witchcraft has
no moving parts of its own, and needs none. It acquires perfectly
adequate moving parts when a person acts upon the reality of the
imagined thing; the real action creates evidence for the imagined
thing” (p. 22). Like the seemingly antiquated belief in witches,
racism (and ableism) are thus an “action and a rationale for action,
or both at once” (p. 17).
The critical frame of Whiteness lends further explanation to a
racecraft of disability labeling and the formation of minority
identities as status problems. The biopolitical racism of special
education policy invokes what Leonardo (2009), extending Mills’s
(1997) formulation, describes as a Racial Contract. The implicit
consensus of this sumptuary codes is that students of color enter
into a world already structured by state apparatuses, like schools,
which function as “mechanisms of white power in a herrenvolk
democracy where the dominant white group experiences liberty at
the expense of the subordination of racial groups” (p. 52). Special
education policy contractually obfuscates Whiteness through
appropriately ambitious IEPs that at once codify personal sovereignty as scientific and reasons disabilities as juridically discrete.
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Such scientific-juridical adjudications disperse, by rendering
invisible, the functionings of special education’s Racial Contract.
While a Whitening of autism has been documented (Eyal, Hart,
Oncular, Oren, & Rossi, 2010; Heilker, 2012), the critical reading of
Endrew undertaken here is less concerned with knowing why
White children are more likely to be diagnosed with autism and
more interested with interrogating how the pathological tendencies of ableism and Whiteness make it easier to discretely inhere a
diagnosis that relies on eccentric expressions of personal sovereignty to bodies that are already interpolated as not only possessing
rights but having rights based on their expected future use value.
Both interpolating effects makes Whiteness, as Harris (1993)
argued, a property.
Understood as an extension of Whiteness, rights are things
that come to be possessed and leveraged as property by Whites as
a dispensation from communal obligations. While rights are
foundational to this possessive logic, as Leonardo and Broderick
(2011) made evident, to whom disability rights inhere is contingent upon a series of interest convergences that expand the
juridical and scientific borders of Whiteness: “Whiteness as an
ideology is untied to certain bodies,” rather it is an “articulation of
disparate elements . . . that benefit Whites in absolute ways and
minority groups relative only to one and other” (p. 2209). As a
series of disparate elements, Whiteness recruits into its propertied
borders identities that extend its political-economic reach.
Endrew points to how juridical practices affirm individual lives as
deserving of and eligible for fostering when they are recognized
as sovereign and in possession of their disabilities. Arguing
against these legal protections, Leonardo (2009) has noted that
Whiteness as property requires first propertizing Black bodies and
secondly transforming the political-economic benefits of this
maneuver into common sense (p. 177). American jurisprudence is
thus predicated upon Whiteness being a private possession whose
immediate guarantee is indefinitely extended into the distance
through legal protections that enclose life by rendering it private
property.
Within this common sense, dis/ability often goes unrecognized as a property due to the obfuscating effects of special
education’s Racial Contract. In expanding the scope of IEPs,
Endrew reinscribes individualized rights claims and property
damages as the proper avenues for legally redressing misuses of
special education. Accordingly, even when legal decisions are not
ostensibly about race, Whiteness is still validated as a property with
an expected future use value that is deserving of and eligible for
legal protections. The appropriately ambitiousness of special
education policy post-Endrew is thus likely to extend the biopolitical horizons of Whiteness to include dis/ability while continuing to
define students of color as status problems who, because they are
dislocated by the propertied logic of Whiteness, are likely to be
included within special education policy as populational groups
who are “at risk” or in need of “fixing.” Extending this reasoning,
Campbell (2009) argued that the same interest convergences that
govern special education’s Racial Contract also orders how the law
narrates dis/ability. That is, similar strange maneuverings work to
delimit the ability of students of color to legally redress racial
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discrimination even while contingently qualifying dis/ability
through a racecraft of disability labeling.
Turning to CRT, Campbell (2009) has noted that ableism, like
Whiteness, also functions through dispersals. Campbell’s theorizing of dispersal echoes Ogbu’s (2004) arguments about the
collective experiences Black students have with racism while also
bringing into critical relief how the Racial Contract that governs
special education policy displaces students of color into undesirable special education environments through a racecraft of
disability labeling. Within the present interregnum, disablement
is dispersed and ableism is emulated toward individualizations of
disability labeling that often leave students of color to internalize
their oppression or alter their selves toward performances that
reinscribe Whiteness. Similar to how Whiteness renders special
education’s Racial Contract invisible through interest convergences that appropriate dis/ability, the dispersal of ableism works by
dislocating disablement as a non-normate way of being and
stigmatizing difference often to the point of erasure. Dislocated
special education classrooms and the resegregation of American
education evidence this erasure as do racial performances like
“acting white” (Ogbu, 2004) and ableist celebrations of exceptional
persons who refuse to be defined by their disability. Each of these
moments of erasure is witnessed by ableism and Whiteness as signs
of progress, as inclusive movements toward a future negatively
defined as not disabled and non-Black.

The Temporality and In/voluntariness of Race and Dis/ability
Attending to the biopolitical implications of Allston and Endrew
suggests that in addition to joining life and special education policy
through scientific-juridical adjudications, there is also a neoliberal
logic that presumes everyone is already included within both
schools and society. This logic requires individuals to articulate
needs as a qualifying condition of their sovereignty. IEPs contractually structure this arrangement because the capacity to request
educational resources qualifies individuals as sovereign beings in
possession of their disabilities. By contrast, there is little investment in juridically undoing scientifically ascribed disability labels
given that they have already satisfied special education’s Racial
Contract. The juxtaposition of Allston and Endrew evidences how
special education policy forces students of color to articulate harms
that are populational and often aimed at undoing previously
ascribed disability labels, even while it expands qualifying
conditions for students who can articulate disabilities within an
educational regime ordered by future personal and propertied
inflections of life. Within this interregnum, there is not an outside
to schooling or society; rather, individuals exist as part of a totality
of other individuals, all of whom compete to successfully articulate
their needs (Simons & Masschelein, 2015).
This individual/totality double bind means that no one is
excluded from society even if particular populational groups are
disallowed flourishing lives by its social institutions (i.e., schools).
Instead, life is governed as if it were an individual political-
economic domain of freedom. Extending biopolitical racism to
legal questions of dis/ability, inclusion comes to mean that even
though “certain people have ‘mental or physical handicaps’—in the
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traditional sense—[there] is not a reason to exclude them because
they, like others, have their own needs, and each of their lives can
include enterprises as much as can the respective lives of nonhandicapped people” (Simons & Masschelein, 2015, p. 217). Expected
future economic-political uses of oneself as an enterprising
individual govern how special education policy uses inclusion to
overdetermine rights as strategic elaborations of a Racial Contract
whose legal logics produce a “matrix of scientific ableism” (Campbell, 2009, p. 33). IEPs do not equalize educational conditions as
much as they reconfigure the allocation of educational resources
through racially inflected scientific-juridical adjudications of
dis/ability. Ogbu (2004) problematized this presumption, noting
that “minorities experience their mistreatment regardless of their
individual differences in education and ability, in status, physical
appearance or place of residence” (p. 5).
This argument raises the importance of temporally engaging
with special education policy. If, as Ogbu (2004) evidenced,
minorities experience being interpolated as status problems across
time, then special education policy functions atemporally toward
students of color. In contrast to static formations of minorities as
status problems, Whiteness can transmogrify its propertied
borders to include dis/ability. Disability case law has similar
temporal functionings that variously position everyone as already
potentially disabled while also suggesting that disabilities are
temporary given the existence of ameliorative technologies (e.g.,
cochlear implants). Further extending DisCrit into special
education policy, this section attends to how race and dis/ability
are made and unmade as in/voluntary statuses. First, this section
reflects on Campbell’s (2009, 2015) legal observations that
dis/ability classifications are mitigated by either/or medical-legal
distinctions that presume individuals have either immutable
(involuntary) or elective (voluntary) disabilities. A brief genealogy
of the LD label evidences the capacity of special education policy to
strangely maneuver between in/voluntary statuses. Next, this
section genealogically explores the involuntary ways schooling
forms the identities of students of color. Within the history of
special education, two emergences evidence this formation:
Roberts v. City of Boston (1849) and progressive-era studies of
childhood. These events produce a temporal horizon against which
race maneuvers strangely between in/voluntary dis/ability statuses.
In/voluntary distinctions of dis/ability make it something that
is dependent upon degrees of amelioration. According to this
reasoning, involuntary disabilities are deserving of and eligible for
care, whereas voluntary disabilities are undeserving and ineligible
for support because they result from individual choices. Campbell
(2009, 2015) has suggested that voluntary disabilities require
individuals to articulate their needs or else risk being sanctioned
for not taking responsibility for their status problem. Disability
case law, like recent case law that has converged to argue that
African Americans no longer deserve electoral protections, is
intended to delimit which bodies get access to disability labels by
claiming that if everyone is potentially already disabled, then
everyone is legally included within the matrix of scientific ableism.
This reasoning precludes an understanding how disability labeling
is used within special education policy. While Allston was
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undoubtedly included within the meaning of the IDEA,
its inclusion differed markedly from the appropriately ambitious
inclusion mandated by Endrew.
The genealogy of the LD label attests to this difference. As
Sleeter (1987) noted, the LD label emerged within the historical
context of postwar American educational reform and was motivated by a desire among White parents to see that their children
were not labeled according to the extant psychological categories
of mentally retarded, slow learner, emotionally disturbed, and
culturally deprived. As originally conceived, the LD label was thus
intended for failing White students whose poor academic performances differed from those of students of color. In developing this
label, psychologist borrowed diagnostic language from nineteenthand twentieth-century medical studies of brain injuries to derive a
“belief that some sort of organic defect causes some people
difficulty in learning to read” (Sleeter, 1987, p. 225). Said differently:
the LD label emerged as an involuntary disability. This use of the
LD label was furthered by its statutory definition, which excluded
children who have “learning problems which are primarily the
result of visual, hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental retardation,
of emotional disturbance, or environmental, cultural, or economic
disadvantage” (Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, 3). That the IDEA also excludes emotional disturbance in
defining autism raises questions about the intended audiences
of both labels and how disability labeling interacts with neoliberal
uses of inclusion.
This is not to suggest that Endrew F.’s status as a child with
autism is voluntary or that it should be read as a fiction; the intent
is rather to bring into critical relief how the present neoliberal
interregnum is more likely to recognize the immutability of
discrete disabilities than the involuntary statutes ascribed to
racialized minorities. This is because American jurisprudence
inflects Allston and Endrew differently. Endrew is an instance of
redressing a personal injury and economic harm. The tragedy
of Endrew is located in the future expected uses of education for
which Endrew F. is both eligible and deserving but which
inappropriate IEPs curtailed. By contrast, Allston is a moment of
social injury that is collectively unjust but not tragic because each
of the Petitioners needs were individually satisfied. The codification of the LD label in the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act (1975) and the exclusion of emotional disturbance from the
definition of autism found in the IDEA evidence how special
education policy variously instantiates the in/voluntariness of
dis/ability. Biopolitical materialities like environmental, cultural,
or economic disadvantage as well as emotional disturbances
instead reflect voluntary choices to live in poor neighborhoods or
attend failing schools. The logic employed by LMSD parallels
Campbell’s (2009, 2015) observation that individuals with disabilities are expected to avail themselves of ameliorative technologies.
Indeed, given the availability of such technologies, individuals who
fail to do so might not be considered disabled within the meaning
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) because they should
have chosen to mitigate their disability.
If the LD label emerged to protect the expected future uses
White children’s educations, then the logic of separate but equal
democracy & education, vol 27, n-o 2

and progressive-era studies of childhood confirm how education
orders the inclusion of children of color. Roberts prefigured the
neoliberalization of inclusion through the logic of separate but
equal while also foreshadowing a racecraft of disability labeling.
Sarah Roberts was a young Black girl who sought redress before the
Massachusetts Supreme Court for having been denied admittance
to White-only common schools. Central to Roberts’s claim was
that she had to walk past five White-only schools to attend a
Black-only school, which was some distance from her home. In
finding for Boston, the court held that Roberts was not definitionally excluded from attending school because she was already legally
included within Boston common schooling:
The plaintiff had access to a school, set apart for colored children, as
well conducted in all respects, and as well fitted, in point of capacity
and qualification of the instructors, to advance the education of
children under seven years old, as the other primary schools . . . Under
these circumstances, has the plaintiff been unlawfully excluded from
public school instruction? Upon the best consideration we have been
able to give the subject, the court are of the opinion that she has not.
(p. 1708)

Deferring to the judgment of the Boston School Committee (BSC),
the court argued that the BSC can legally prescribe qualifications
for school admittance and thus organize common schooling as it
deems fit. This meant that so long as a Black school was available,
the BSC was operating statutorily. The court furthered this
separate-but-equal logic by grounding Roberts’s segregation
through an appeal to how the BSC established intermediate
schools in response to what Osgood (1997) describes as an undermining of the common school ideal:
It has been found necessary, that is to say, highly expedient, at times,
to establish special schools for poor and neglected children, who have
passed the age of seven, and have become too old to attend the
primary school, and yet have not acquired the rudiments of learning,
to enable them to enter the ordinary schools . . . and it is expedient to
organize them into a separate school, adapted to their condition.
(p. 1710)

Inflecting Allston through Roberts evidences how inclusion is
used to create discriminatory educational conditions. Reading
these cases together, the following reasoning emerges: The
Petitioners had access to an education even if it was set apart
through special education practices that marked these students as
learning disabled, according the expediency of a thoroughly
individualized IEP process. Roberts also brings into critical relief a
paradox of the Racial Contract. In the decades following the
common school era, school attendance will become a legal
mandate, which will require students of color to voluntarily submit
themselves to a system of education that, as Baldwin (1963/1998)
observed, is not intended for their lives. Marked by scientific
classifications that move faster than the possibilities of legal
redress, Ogbu (1990) warranted why Roberts found it difficult to
redress her status problem within extant systems of race relations
by arguing that African Americans experience schooling and
society as involuntary minorities. In distinction to autonomous, or
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numerical minorities (i.e., Jews and Mormons), and voluntary
minorities, or immigrants whose previous cultural locations
provide them with extant collective identities that tend to be
understood by Whiteness as additive, involuntary minorities are
“people who did not initially chose to become members of a
society; rather they were brought into that society through slavery,
conquest, or colonization” (p. 46).
Redress for persistent, significant, and systematic racial
discrimination is difficult because such efforts reify the conceit that
race is objectively real, despite being a scientific-juridical invention
used for the explicit purpose of racial subordination. Extending
this analysis, neoliberalism requires Roberts’s inclusion because
democracies do not contractually exclude even if segregation
remains an operative practice (Simons & Masschelein, 2015).
Similarly, while LMSD argued that the Petitioners first desired and
then sought to revoke their LD labels, statements from the
Petitioners express frustration about the process of disability
labeling. It was not, then, a series of ever-shifting positions that led
some Petitioners to rescind previous requests for disability status
but their experience with IEPs as delimiting their possibility
of receiving appropriate educations. Baker’s (1998) genealogy of
childhood is another reminder of how special education’s Racial
Contract presumes a temporality that is applied differently to
different student bodies. The emerging study of children, a
historical precursor of special education, was predicated throughout upon the construction of Blackness “as synonymous with
‘savagery’ and with childhood at all ages,” which meant that “one
could have a childhood only if one was eventually able to occupy
adulthood;” and “one could not occupy adulthood if one was
thought to have inherited ‘savagery’” (p. 127). The conclusion to
this racist syllogism was that moving beyond childhood requires
individual students to supersede Blackness, that is, to individually
escape inappropriate educational conditions, a movement that
education continues to define as educability. Furthermore, defined
biopolitically and “encoded in the meaning of ‘scientific pedagogy,’” Blackness became “the property through which Whiteness
could secure itself ” (p. 128).
Extending Harris (1993), possessing or “having” a childhood
helps explain why, despite prolonged institutional attempts,
students of color seem permanently incapable of achieving
flourishing lives. Against the emergences of separate but equal and
eugenic studies of childhood, Ogbu (2004) critiqued how the
individualizing dispositifs of ableism and Whiteness continue to
collectively dislocate involuntary minorities as educational status
problems:
[I]nvoluntary minorities respond collectively as a group and they
respond as individuals in ways that reinforce their existence and
collective identity . . . That is, their very attempts to solve their status
problem leads them to develop a new sense of who they are, that is in
opposition to their understanding of who the dominant group
members are. (p. 5)

Read together, Baker (1998), Campbell (2009, 2015), and Ogbu
(1990, 2004) suggest that determinations of who—which
bodies—get to “have” a childhood attests to how scientific
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reasoning superstitiously embodies and then puts to use childhood
for particularizing biopolitical ends. Those colonial populations
encountered through child study became involuntary minorities
whose existence outside the temporality of Western civilization
warranted their racial subordination because of their ascribed
disabled and childlike statuses. This reasoning continues to justify
special education interventions into the lives of children of color
who remain eugenically positioned as being “at risk” and in need
of “fixing.” Scientific speculations about the future qualifications of
which lives matter finds a legalistic corollary in the uses of disability labeling to obscure the collective lived experiences of
students of color in favor of already prescribed individual educational futures.
Allston and Endrew are contemporary examples of how
special education policy both constructs and maintains
in/voluntary statuses through convergent uses of race and
dis/ability. One the one hand, Allston requires students of color to
articulate harms that are collective while denying their collectively
shared involuntary experiences with racism; on the other hand,
Endrew expands individual rights for students with discrete
disabilities who articulate individual injury as an economic harm
that prevents their voluntary future uses of education. The
collective harms being challenged by Allston are complicated by
LMSD’s argument that the Petitioners’ disabilities were ever-
shifting and thus potentially voluntary, whereas the regime of
personal sovereignty being celebrated in Endrew is complicated by
presumptions that discrete disabilities are involuntary and that
rights inhere equally across the population despite being particular
in their design and immunizing in their intent. Impacting this
juxtaposition, Baker (2002) has argued that “institutions can make
judgments about further categories such as race, class, sexuality,
and gender by calling them ‘individual differences’ or something
else (‘intelligence’) and refer for security’s sake to the exam results”
(p. 694). Any examination, as Fields and Fields (2014) demonstrated, results in an unequal rank ordering of individuals through
sumptuary codes that always justify previous classifications and
which already disallow those populational groups dislocated by the
examination appropriate educational futures.

Conclusion: Affirming Educational Life
The temporality of race and dis/ability provides a critical backdrop
against which the future possibilities of educational life can be
addressed. A racecraft of disability labeling makes possible the
continuing maintenance and construction of racial discrimination
because special education policy attends to the amelioration of life
by enclosing it within a propertied logic that values education
according to its expected future use value. This temporality not
only governs which disabilities are understood to be in/voluntary
but also orders the inclusion of involuntary minorities within
special education. The present-historical configurations of special
education policy explored in the previous two sections attests to
the uses of disability labeling to delimit the educational growth of
students of color and to restrict their access to appropriate educations. In suggesting an affirmation of educational life, this concluding section gestures toward the life-affirming possibilities of
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education understood as, Esposito (2008) has argued, the pluralization of life rather than protections of individual lives.
Understood affirmatively, education becomes a space where the
collective lived experiences of students of color are valued for their
educational vitality. Such valuations take seriously Dewey’s
(1916/1997) democratically motivated claim that “since education is
not a means to living, but is identical with the operation of living a
life which is fruitful and inherently significant, the only ultimate
value which can be set up is just the process of living itself ”
(pp. 239–240).
Thinking through educational life affirmatively holds in
attention how the inability to make life a norm toward which
special education policy is articulated interdicts against the living
possibilities of education. As education becomes more scientifically and juridically mediated, the possibilities of future growth
become increasingly delimited. This means that education is
inextricably biopolitical and raises the question of whether life can
be preserved apart from its negative protections. The juxtaposition
of Allston and Endrew is attentive to these particular embodiments of educational life and to the uses of disability labeling to
qualify life within education. Remembering Colker’s (2013)
question, we might also ask: If education is something that cannot
help but inflect life, how might education and life be read together
to counter the morbidity of education’s present interregnum? What
is needed contra apparatuses that secure the propertied futures of
specific children are practices of education capable of releasing the
biopolitical energy of childhood. Such practices must account for
how race and dis/ability have genealogically defined educational
life through a racecraft of disability labeling. Arguing against
adherence to strict empiric definitions of childhood, Dewey
(1902/1990) noted that the child and the curriculum are mutually
constitutive forces rather than discrete essences:
Abandon the notion of subject-matter as something fixed and
ready-made in itself, outside the child’s experience; cease thinking of
the child’s experience as also something hard and fast; see it as
something fluent, embryonic, vital; and we realize that the child and
the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process.
(p. 189)

Following this formulation, children of color are no longer
problem-solvers, which suggests a negative attention to deficits in
intelligence and an overemphasis on ability, but become problem-
posers, which means science is not something done by psychologists to them through eugenically motivated examinations but is
something that is already a part of their everyday lived experiences.
Within this formulation of educational life, the present becomes a
problem for inquiry. If science has a troubling history of being
applied to children of color, it is important to experiment with
present life as a creative force through which these children can
reinscribe the world with new collective meanings. In reconfiguring the temporality of race and dis/ability through childhood, it is
perhaps helpful to recall Dewey’s (1938/1997) own historical
thinking: “the sound principle that the objectives of learning are in
the future and its immediate materials are in present experience
can be carried into effect only in the degree that present experience
democracy & education, vol 27, n-o 2

is stretched, as it were, backward. It can expand into the future only
as it is enlarged into the past” (p. 77). A continuity of experience
thus organizes both the lives of students of color and the life
of education. The problem for education, then, is not a dearth of
pedagogical situations or a lack of biopolitical energy, but a failure
to utilize these situations and this energy methodologically.
Understood as scientific inquirers in the world rather than objects
of scientific study, children of color provide a way “for getting at the
significance of our everyday experience of the world in which we
live” and “a working pattern of the way in which and the conditions
under which experiences are used to lead ever onward and
outward” (p. 88).
To move onward and outward, education must recognize the
increasing role special education policy plays in defining educational life and qualifying life within education as well as the ways
either/or thinking continues to inform how such policies use race
and dis/ability. For Leonardo (2009), any such confrontation will
necessarily require practices of neo-abolition within which White
students and parents own their racialization. This formulation
attends to how Whiteness operates as property within special
education policy without ever having to be owned by those who
benefit from such operations. Critical Whiteness Studies brings
into relief how certain disabilities can be possessed to the benefit
of White students and parents without either having to own their
Whiteness. Divesting special education policy from Whiteness
thus requires first acknowledging how education is invested in
perpetuating possessive neoliberal logics even while Whiteness
forgets its past. In contrast to moments of forgetfulness, Ogbu
(2004) noted that involuntary minorities tend to view the past as a
condition of potential success that often stands in contrast to
present iterations of poor school adjustment and academic
performance. Echoing Leonardo, this temporal critique reminds
special education policy how it ascribes disability labels onto
students of color in ways that interpolate them as disabled often
in contrast to these students’ past and present lived experiences.
Constructed as such, involuntary minorities tend to view their
cultural differences not as barriers to be overcome but as strengths
that distinguish them from Whiteness. Accordingly, educational
life for involuntary minorities is less about acquiring individualized disability labels and more about collectively overcoming
persistent, significant, and systematic racial discrimination.
While building an affirmative theory of educational life will
have to be attentive to these insights, there is perhaps scaffolding
already contained within Dewey’s (1938/1997) reflections on
experience and education. In dispelling the either/or thinking that
accompanied debates between traditional and progressive
education, Dewey rejected dualisms that position experience
and education, the child and the curriculum, and the school and
society as oppositional. Instead of negations designed to protect
life, Dewey argued for the creation of and/and spaces within
which life might circulate as lived growth. This biopolitical
formulation suggests that rather than imposing new scientific-
juridical adjudications, special education policy should recognize those experiences which already exist. Such affirmations make
possible future critiques of how a neoliberal philosophy of life
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cannot be understood apart from the lives such a philosophy
makes possible while also providing entry into imagining educational life once again anew, as a practice of living.
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